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Abstract: The Wisconsin Works (W-2) program, the TANF program in Wisconsin,
has introduced performance contracting to align W-2 service providers’ objectives
with the state’s goals by establishing financial and administrative incentives.
Using individual-level administrative datasets from 1998 to 2005, this study
examines whether the introduction and revision of the earnings gain rate standard
improved the economic performance of W-2 participants. Results reveal that
under exacerbating economic conditions and weakening financial incentives, the
adoption of the earnings gain standard had a positive effect on maintaining the
earing gain of W-2 participants. However, W-2 agencies responded to the
changes in the earnings gain rate standard by controlling the movement of W-2
participants in and out of the program and selecting those who were more likely
to be employed. This study discusses a better contract design to improve the
effectiveness of the welfare service provision.
Keywords: performance-based contracting, Wisconsin Works (W-2), TANF,
welfare-to-work program
INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) in the United States has induced major changes in the administration
of public welfare services for people in need. The PROWRA broadened the types of
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) services that could be provided
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by nongovernmental entities (GAO, 2002, p. 6). It also authorized the states to exercise
substantial discretion about whether to devolve the responsibility for providing TANF
services to lower-level governments or private agencies (Weissert, 2000, p. 14; Dias &
Maynard-Moody, 2006, p. 189). Consequently, state governments have increased the
contracting out of welfare services to private service providers.
Following this new trend, Wisconsin has allowed private agencies to operate the
Wisconsin Works (W-2), the TANF program in Wisconsin, which has led to a compe-
tition among public, nonprofit, and for-profit agencies. In 1997, private agencies came
to manage the W-2 program in nine counties, including Milwaukee County, where 70%
of W-2 participants had been enrolled (Kaplan, 2000). Additionally, performance-based
contracting was introduced to align W-2 agencies’ objectives with the state govern-
ment’s policy goals through incentive schemes at agencies. Under a performance-
based contract, the amount paid to a contractor as well as any contract renewal or
extension depends on the contractors’ achieving a predetermined set of performance
objectives or standards (GAO, 2002; McConnell, Burwick, Perez-Johnson, & Winston,
2003; Barnow & Smith, 2004; Martin, 2005). Performance-based contracting serves
as the primary mechanism for monitoring and enhancing the performance of W-2
agencies by tying administrative and financial incentives to the agencies’ performances
(Heinrich & Choi, 2007).
Using the administrative records of W-2 participants from 1997 to 2005, this study
examines whether adopting performance standards contributes to improving the eco-
nomic outcomes of the W-2 participants. It also analyzes how W-2 agencies responded
to the changes in performance standards. Although there have been considerable studies
that have evaluated TANF programs, few analyses have been undertaken regarding
whether performance-based contracting is related to the performance of TANF partici-
pants. Several state-level case studies on the administration of TANF programs have
examined major administrative changes, including the devolution of responsibility for
welfare or job service provision to lower government agencies (Gainsborough, 2003;
Kelleher & Yackee, 2004; Heinrich & Choi, 2007), and coordination problems among
various administrative bodies (Norris & Thompson, 1995; Liebschutz, 2000; Weissert,
2000; Sanger, 2003; Van Slyke, 2003). While several studies have examined the effec-
tiveness of performance-based contracting in welfare-to-work programs (Koning &
Heinrich, 2013) and education (Boyne & Chen, 2006), there is insufficient empirical
evidence as to whether the adoption of performance standards cause changes in the
responses of TANF service providers and the performance of TANF participants (Dias
& Maynard-Moody, 2006).
This study focuses on the earnings gain rate standard built in W-2 performance-
based contracting, measured by the proportion of employed participants with an earnings
32 Youseok Choi
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
gain. A major reason for examining the earnings gain rate standard is that there have
been substantial variations in the way it has been applied over time and across subgroups
of W-2 participants. In contrast, no such variations are found in other employment-
related performance standards such as employment rate and job retention rate. It is
more challenging for W-2 agencies to meet the earning gain rate standard, particularly
under the exacerbating economic situation prevalent since 2000. To ensure that they
meet the standard, W-2 agencies may utilize more resources or devise innovative ways
to improve participants’ earnings. Therefore, the earnings gain standard is very useful
for observing the response of W-2 agencies to the changes in the W-2 performance-
based contact.
This study investigates how W-2 agencies responded to the changes in the earnings
gain rate standard and whether the application of the new standard enhanced the 
economic outcomes of W-2 participants. Did W-2 agencies adjust the entry and exit of
W-2 participants to achieve the earnings gain standard? Did they select the participants
with better earning prospects? Did the adoption of the earnings gain standard increase
the earning of W-2 participants? This paper addresses these questions by analyzing the
administrative data of W-2 participants. The variations in the earnings gain rate stan-
dard in the W-2 program provide a natural experiment that can identify the effect of
performance standards on its performance.
The extent to which the intended effects of changes to welfare policies and admin-
istrative structures are realized depends on the reactions of welfare service providers to
these changes (Duggan, 2000). Therefore, knowledge of providers’ response to changes
in performance-based contracting is essential to developing a better governance struc-
ture between the states and welfare service providers. This paper generates insights 
as to how to design a performance contract that improves the effectiveness of welfare
administration.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: 
PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTRACTING AND 
BEHAVIORS OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Designing Incentives to Motivate Service Providers
When state governments contract out welfare services to private providers, they need
to address the problem of motivating service providers by designing performance-
based contracts. Governments and service providers may have different objectives and
information (Moe, 1984; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991).1 Due to asymmetric information,
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governments may not accurately observe the level of service providers’ efforts (Pratt
& Zeckhauser, 1991). Governments may observe outcomes or performances of service
providers more easily than the level of effort exerted by them. Thus, by rewarding 
program outcomes specified by performance standards, governments can motivate 
service providers to work better (Prendergast, 1999). Financial rewards should be
determined on the basis of how well the providers perform their tasks (Milgrom &
Roberts, 1992).
However, holding service providers responsible through tying the compensation to
their performances exposes them to a risk of uncertain income (Milgrom & Roberts,
1992). In the areas of job training and TANF services, the performance of providers is
affected not only by their efforts but also by uncontrollable factors such as economic
conditions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Thus, incentive contracts
such as performance-based contracts transfer a portion of the risk of variability in
incomes from governments to service providers. A key issue in incentive contracting
is how to balance gains from providing incentives (e.g. improvement of service quality)
against the costs of motivating service providers to bear the risk (e.g., provision of 
performance bonus) (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p. 208).
The compensation system specifies who assumes the risk and responsibility for
performance (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991, p. 24). Different contracting types have
different implications with respect to incurred costs. Under cost reimbursement con-
tracts, providers have a low incentive to lower costs and a strong incentive to report
overstated expenses to governments (McAfee & McMillan, 1989). If the quality of
services matters, cost reimbursement contracts would be better than fixed-price con-
tracts. In contrast, under fixed-price contracts, providers have strong incentives to
search for ways of lowering costs and weak incentives to increase costs. Thus, under
fixed-price contracts, the powerful incentive to reduce costs might hurt the quality of
services unless governments regulate the quality of services appropriately. TANF 
service providers might be tempted to save costs by skimping on quality (McAfee &
McMillan, 1989, p. 39) or by enrolling participants who are more employable (Barnow
& Smith, 2004). Performance-based contracts that tie performance to payment might
address these problems better than other types of contracts.
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1. Governments have difficulty in monitoring whether providers take appropriate actions to
achieve program goals or just engage in self-interested activities and difficulty in inducing
providers to behave appropriately (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p. 170).
Developing Performance Standards in Performance Management Systems
Under the management system for steering service providers, implementing perfor-
mance contract includes a series of tasks: setting clear objectives and standards,
designing rewards for providers that meet the standards and sanctions for those that do
not, and monitoring and evaluating providers’ performances (Verhoest, 2005; Barnow
& Smith, 2004). Developing appropriate performance measures is a major component
of a performance contract. By specifying performance goals and encouraging service
providers to accomplish the goals, the government can address the problem of infor-
mational deficiency (Dixit, 2001). The goals of both parties may be aligned more
closely because clear objectives and targets have been set and negotiated (Verhoest,
2005).
Well-designed performance measures may safeguard against excessive cost-reduc-
tion activities that may hurt the quality of services. Without performance standards, for
example, private agencies might pursue excessive cost-saving activities, particularly
under fixed-cost contracting (McAfee & McMillan, 1989). By asking the providers 
to achieve certain standards and motivating them to meet higher performance goals,
governments can improve the performance of service contractors. Because payment 
is made or a contract is renewed only when the providers achieve targeted levels of
performance, service providers are motivated to focus their activities on the program
outcomes and to reduce spending on unnecessary or wasteful activities (Martin, 2005).
Intended Effects of Performance-Based Contracting
There are several ways the adoption of performance contracting affects the perfor-
mance of the TANF program. Performance contracting is an accountability mechanism
for dealing with information asymmetry (Gormley & Weimer, 1999). The problem of
information asymmetry may be lessened through various information-revealing instru-
ments such as requirements for the submission of business plans, performance evalua-
tion, and audits, which are built in performance-based contracting (Verhoest, 2005).
Governments can obtain more information for making decisions and gain more useful
insights into service contractors. The visibility of performance may lead governments
and TANF service providers to be more concerned about outcomes (Jennings & Haist,
2004). Because the public may better compare the performance of different service
providers than before, public administrators and public or private managers have to
increase their efforts to improve the performance in TANF program.
The availability of performance information also leads to a design mechanism that
tightly links reward and punishment to performance (Jennings & Haist, 2004). Public
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opinion may create pressure to adopting instruments linking performance with rewards
or punishments. Performance reports affect the reputation of TANF providers, the 
professional prestige and career opportunities of the public or private managers, and
service providers’ access to financial resources. Public or private managers thus see to
develop strategies and mobilize more resources to achieve performance goals (Jennings
& Haist, 2004).
Gaming Behaviors of Service Providers: 
Cream-Skimming and Parking Effects
As governments link contract payments for service providers to program perfor-
mance using performance-based contracting, service providers assume the risk of
lower financial compensation when they fail to achieve performance standards. Thus,
service providers might strive to meet performance goals, which results in unintended
effects such as cream skimming and the parking of program participants (Koning and
Heinrich, 2013).
In the areas of job training and welfare services, including TANF, selection, or
cream skimming, refers to providers’ selecting participants who will enable the agency
to more easily meet program goals such as job placement and earnings gain (Courty &
Marske, 2004; Lu, 2014). Providers have disincentives to serve people with poor
employment prospects. Parking is a type of cream-skimming behavior. Service providers
have incentives to control the flow of program participants (Koning & Heinrich,
2013). To enhance the job placement rate in a contract period, for example, providers
may use more resources on participants with better job prospects and provide fewer
services to those with poorer job prospects (Koning and Heinrich, 2013). Consequently,
the job search duration of easy-to-place participants will be shorter, while that of 
hard-to-place participants will be longer (Koning and Heinrich, 2013). Thus, parking
increases the gap in job placement rates between the two groups (Koning and Heinrich,
2013). A related problem arises with outcome-oriented incentive systems that give 
service providers discretion over the timing of the graduation of participants (Courty
& Marschke, 2004); they can use this to their advantage, controlling the timing of the
movement of job trainees into placements so that they meet target levels (Courty &
Marschke, 2004).
Researchers have looked for empirical evidences of selection and parking problems
in various policy contexts (Shen, 2003; Courty & Marschke, 2004; Koning & Heinrich,
2013). However, data limitations have precluded directly testing selection effects (Shen,
2003). This research empirically examines both performance-enhancing and selection
effects of performance-based contracting in the W-2 program.
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POLICY CONTEXT AND HYPOTHESES
W-2 Performance Contracting Structure and Features
Using W-2 performance-based contracting, the state of Wisconsin ties W-2 agencies’
performances to administrative and financial compensations (Breaux, Duncan, Keller,
& Morris, 2002) and determines the prerequisites that W-2 agencies have to meet to
earn performance bonuses and other rewards. Between 1997 and 2005, there were four
rounds of biannual performance contracting (1997-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, and
2004-2005) in the W-2 program. The state introduced performance standards such as job
placement rate, earnings gain rate, and job retention rate during the second contract
round (2000-2001) to measure W-2 agencies’ performances.
It also set up three levels of performance, a base performance level, a first bonus
level, and a second bonus level, which determine the agencies’ right of first selection
(RFS) and bonus payments (Department of Workforce Development, 2001a; Wisconsin
Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001; Heinrich & Choi, 2007). Table 1 shows the perfor-
mance measures and target levels for W-2 participants used during 2000-2005 contract
periods.2 For example, during 2000-2001, W-2 agencies needed to place at least 35%
of exited participants into paid jobs to achieve the base performance level of the job
placement rate. If W-2 agencies met the base performance level, they were able to
obtain RFS, so that they would not have to compete with other contractors in the next
contract round (Department of Workforce Development, 2001a; Wisconsin Legislative
Audit Bureau, 2001). If they achieved the first bonus level, which is set higher than the
base level, they can earn performance bonuses. W-2 agencies should meet all of the
performance standards at each level to earn the right of first selection and performance
bonuses (Department of Workforce Development, 2001b; Wisconsin Legislative Audit
Bureau, 2001). Thus, W-2 agencies bear substantial risks of achieving performance
goals.
Another major part of W-2 performance-based contracting is to decide the composi-
tion and size of performance rewards. Table 2 presents basic structures of performance
bonuses rewarding high performances in the W-2 program. There were substantial
changes in the provision of performance bonuses over the four contract periods. The
first contract (1997-1999) offered opportunities for W-2 agencies to obtain large finan-
cial rewards from administering public welfare programs (Heinrich & Choi, 2007).
Agencies achieving the bonus level could keep up to 7% of unspent budgets as unre-
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2. Heinrich & Choi (2007) provides detailed information on performance measures and target
levels used in the four contract periods.
stricted bonuses (see table 2).3 The prospect of earning large bonuses for achieving 
W-2 performance goals served as a powerful incentive for W-2 agencies (Heinrich &
Choi, 2007). W-2 agencies earned $65.1 million as performance bonuses, which 
constituted 15.7% of the budget for primary contract services. In addition, W-2 agencies
obtained $66.5 million as community reinvestment funds (Wisconsin Legislative
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3. If the unspent funds exceeded 7% of the contract budget, the remaining funds were divided
between the state and W-2 agencies; 10% of the remaining budget was given to agencies as
unrestricted profit. Out of the remaining 90% of funds, 45% was allocated to the agency as
community reinvestment funds for services to people in need. The other 45% was retained
by the state (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 1999, p. 12, Heinrich & Choi, 2007).
Table 1. Performance Measures and Target Levels, 2000-2005
Performance Measures 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract(2000-2001) (2002-2003) (2004-2005)
base performance 35% 35% 35%level (RFS)
1st bonus level 40% 35%
2nd bonus level 45% 40%
base performance equal to or greater 50% with any 
level (RFS) than base wage monthly earnings NArate at 1998 gain
base wage rate 50% with any 1st bonus level + 2.5% monthly earnings gain of $50
base wage rate 50% with any 2nd bonus level + 5% monthly earnings gain of $1000
base performance 75% 75% NAlevel (RFS)
1st bonus level 80% 80%
2nd bonus level 85% 85%
base performance 50% 50% NAlevel (RFS)
1st bonus level 55% 55% NA
2nd bonus level 60% 60% NA
Source: Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (2001, 2005); Department of Workforce Development (2003a,
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The second round of W-2 contracting in 2000-2001 increased contract performance
requirements and the level of monitoring (Heinrich & Choi, 2007). A key change
under this new contract was the introduction of outcome-based standards as a measure of
performance achievements. Another change was a reduction in the level of performance
bonuses to a total of 4% of the contract budget (table 2). As a result, W-2 agencies’
unrestricted bonuses totaled $12.8 million, which constituted 3.7% of the primary contract
services budget. The community reinvestment funds totaled $5.4 million. In effect, while
performance requirements became more stringent, opportunities to earn performance
bonuses became more limited (Heinrich & Choi, 2007).
During the third contract period (2002-2003) the state improved contract manage-
ment in an effort to increase the effectiveness of the W-2 program (Heinrich & Choi,
2007). The legislature imposed substantial constraints on the state with regard to the rules
for determining performance rewards (Heinrich & Choi, 2007). In the first two con-
tract periods, bonus rates and funds available for performance bonuses were specified
Evaluating Performance-Based Contracting in Welfare-to-Work Programs 39
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Table 2. Performance Rewards and Expenditures of W-2 Program, 1999-2005
1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract
(1997-1999) (2000-2001) (2002-2003) (2004-2005)
Base RFS earned when base performance level was met
Contract community 45% of 3% of contract replaced by replaced by 
Performance reinvestment remaining amount emergency emergency funds surplus fund fund
1st Bonus 2% of contract amount is bonus 
Level 1st bonus amount not specified eliminated(unrestricted) (unrestricted)
2nd Bonus 2% of contract amount is bonus 
Level 2nd bonus amount not specified eliminated(unrestricted) (unrestricted)
primary 
contract $ 413.6 $ 348.0 $ 313.9 $ 284.5
services
performance $65.1 $12.8 
bonus (15.7%) (3.7%)
community $66.5 $5.4 reinvestment (16.1%) (1.6%)funds
Source: Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (2001, 2005); Department of Workforce Development (2003a,
2003b); Heinrich & Choi (2007).











in advance. However, in the third period, the funds available for performance bonuses
were set by the biennial budget for 2002-2003 (Department of Workforce Develop-
ment, 2001a; Heinrich & Choi, 2007). Furthermore, the bonuses earned during this
contract period were not paid until approximately one year after the end of the contract
(Heinrich & Choi, 2007). It was uncertain whether W-2 agencies would receive per-
formance bonuses, even though they met the bonus performance levels specified in the
contract (Department of Workforce Development, 2003b). In fact, they did not end up
receiving any performance bonuses during this contract period (Wisconsin Legislative
Audit Bureau, 2005).
The biennial budget for 2004-2005 eliminated performance bonus funding during
the fourth contract period (2004-2005), although the W-2 contract specified criteria
under which bonuses might be earned if performance bonus funding became available
(Heinrich & Choi, 2007). The only reward for W-2 agencies achieving performance
targets in the 2004-2005 W-2 contract period was RFS. The financial incentives that had
been built into W-2 performance contracting had become weaker over time (Heinrich
& Choi, 2007).
W-2 Job Placements
Participants in the W-2 program are assigned various jobs based on their education
level and work experiences (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001). Financial
and employment planners in W-2 agencies evaluate W-2 applicants’ eligibility for the
W-2 program and assign W-2 participants specific job placements. The placements are
structured like a ladder (Kaplan, 2000). The participants move to upper levels as they
achieve milestones such as getting a job or successfully completing job training or
other work activities (Kaplan, 2000; Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001).
Table 3 shows the types of job placements in the W-2 program. The placements are
broadly classified into upper tier and lower tier, depending on whether the W-2 partici-
pants are employed or receive cash benefits (Kaplan, 2000). W-2 participants in the
upper tier do not receive cash benefits because they are either employed or just about
ready to be employed (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001a). Case management
follow-up (CMF) placement, case management for working individuals (CMU) place-
ment, and case management for job-ready individuals (CMS) placement are classified
as part of the upper tier.
When participants previously assigned in the lower tier become employed, they are
moved into the CMF placement and given follow-up case management services for at
least six months (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001). The quarterly earnings of
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those who exited CMF placements in 2004 were about US$2,259. Employed applicants
applying for help from the W-2 program are placed in CMU. Unemployed applicants
who are ready for unsubsidized employment are placed in CMS (Wisconsin Legislative
Audit Bureau, 2001). Because CMF participants are employed as a result of successful
service provisions by W-2 agencies, their placements are regarded as the most prized
accomplishments of W-2 agencies. CMF and CMU participants are exemplars for
other W-2 participants.
The lower tier comprises five types of placements: trial job (TJB); community 
service job (CSJ), which includes CS1, CS2, CS3 placements tied the number of hours
per week the person works (10-14, 15-19, or 20-29 hours per week respectively), W-2
transition job (W-2T), and case management for caretakers of newborns (CMC)
(Kaplan, 2000; Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001). The lower-tier job place-
ments have a two-year limit. The participants in lower-tier placements receive cash
benefits amounting to maximum US$673 per month, which can be adjusted per their
compliance with work requirements (Kaplan, 2000).
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Table 3. Job Placements in W-2 Program
Average 
Job Placements Features End-Quarter 
Earnings in 2004
employed participants previously 
CMF assigned to a subsidized $2,259
employment position
CMU employed applicants applying for $2,086W-2 program
CMS unemployed applicants ready for $675unsubsidized employment
TJB subsidized employment (subsidy $2,506to employer: max. $300)
CSJ cash benefit ($673) $1,589 (CS1)
CS1, CS2, CS3 cash benefit ($230, $341, $452) $644 (CSJ)
W-2T cash benefit ($628) $383
CMC no work-related requirement, $621cash benefit ($673)
Source: Kaplan (2000), Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (2001, 2005). Author’s calculations are based
on earnings in 2004.
Lower Tier (Case 
Management and 
Cash Benefits)
Upper Tier (Case 
Management Only)
Changes in the Earnings Gain Rate Standard
There were no changes in the rates of job placement and job retention over the 
contract periods effected by (see table 1). However, there were substantial changes in
the way earnings gain rate standard was defined and measured between the second
and the third contract periods. Table 4 shows the application of the earnings gain rate
standard during the four rounds of W-2 contracts.
The earnings gain rate standard was first introduced in the second contract period.
It is measured by the changes in the earnings of W-2 participants when they enter and
exit the W-2 program (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001). The earnings gain
rate is the percentage of participants with positive earnings gain, which is calculated
by the number of W-2 participants who exit with positive earnings gain divided by the
number of W-2 participants who exit (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001).
In the second contract period, the earnings gain rate standard was applied to all
employed W-2 participants in order to obtain RFS and performance bonuses (Wiscon-
sin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2001; Heinrich & Choi, 2007). However, in the third
contract period, the standard was applied to specific participant groups, namely, those
in unsubsidized employment placements such as CMF and CMU. The standard no
longer had to be applied to participants in lower tiers such as TJB, CSJ, and W-2T
(Department of Workforce Development, 2004). The earnings gain rate standard was
considered appropriate only for those employed at the beginning of the provision of
W-2 case management services. The earnings at entry into CMF and CMU placements
were compared with those at the exit from the placements. In the middle of the 2002-
2003 contract, the earnings gain standard became optional (Department of Workforce
Development, 2004). W-2 agencies no longer need to meet the standard to obtain RFS
and performance bonuses.
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Table 4. Application of Earnings Gain Rate Standard, 1997-2005
1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract
(1997-1999) (2000-2001) (2002-2003) (2004-2005)
CMF, CMU applied (2002)(unsubsidized employment not applied applied not applied (2003) not appliedin upper tier)
TJB, CSJ, W-2T
(unemployed or subsidized not applied applied not applied not applied
employment in lower tier)
Source: Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (2001, 2005); Department of Workforce Development (2003a,
2003b); Heinrich & Choi (2007).
W-2 Agencies’ Response to the Changes in Earnings Gain Rate Standard
W-2 agencies could meet the earnings gain rate standard in three ways. First, they
could reduce the number of CMF or CMU placements. Since there were no restric-
tions on the time limit for the provision of case management services in the upper tier
or on the number of CMF or CMU placements, W-2 agencies might “park” the partici-
pants who were less likely to be employed and prevent them from moving up to the
CMF or CMU placements. If they did this, then the entry rate of participants in CMF
or CMU placements in 2002 would be lower than that of CMF or CMU participants
for 2000-2001.
In addition, W-2 agencies might defer the exit of CMF or CMU participants with
no earnings gain, which is also a type of parking (Koning & Heinrich, 2013). Since the
denominator of the earnings gain rate is the number of CMF or CMU participants who
exit during the contract period, W-2 agencies would have an incentive to postpone the
exit of CMF or CMU participants with no earnings gain until another year (Barnow &
Smith, 2004; Commons, McGuire, & Riordan, 1997). If the agencies did postpone the
exit of these participants, the exit rate in 2002 might be lower than that for CMF or
CMU participants during 2000-2001.
Second, since performance standards are usually announced about one year before
each contract begins, W-2 agencies might use this knowledge to select participants for
the program who were more likely to have an earnings gain and who had better job
prospects. If the agencies did so, the CMF or CMU participants who exited in 2002
might be better educated and have a longer employment history than those who exited
in the 2001-2001 contract period.
Third, W-2 agencies might try to increase the earnings gain of participants to
whom the standard is applied and reduce intensive services given to other groups of
participants (e.g., participants in a lower-tier placement such as CSJ). W-2 agencies
might mobilize their resources for participants or activities that contribute to meeting
the required performance standards (Brodkin, Fuqua, & Thoren, 2002; Thiel &
Leeuw, 2003; Dias & Maynard-Moody, 2006). The application of the earnings gain
standard to just CMU and CMF participants in 2002 could result in the level of earnings
gain for these participants in 2002 being higher than or similar to the level as CMF
and CMU participants in 2000-2001 owing to provision of more targeted services to
those in CMU and CMF placements. W-2 agencies might also allocate fewer
resources to other groups of participants such as TJB or CS1 than they did during the
previous contract period because these participants were no longer being counted in
the calculation of the earnings gain rate standard. This study uses the participants in
TJB and CS1 placements as a comparison group to identify the effect of earnings gain
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standard because they match CMF and CMU participants more in terms of earnings
than other participant groups do. If W-2 agencies did allocate fewer resources to
lower-tier groups, then the level of earnings gain for TJB or CS1 participants might be
lower in 2002 than in 2000- 2001. Consequently, the earnings gain differential
between CMF and CMU and TJB and CS1 participants might be greater in 2002 than
in the previous period.
The elimination of the earnings gain rate standard in 2003 enables us to reconfirm
the role of the earnings gain standard. Since it was eliminated at the end of 2002, W-2
agencies might have reduced their efforts to improve the earnings gain of CMF or
CMU participants from that point on. If they did, then the earnings gain of CMF or
CMU participants in 2003 might be lower than that in 2002. On the other hand, the
earnings gain for TJB or CS1 participants might be similar between the two periods
(2002 versus 2003) because the earnings gain rate standard had already been eliminated
in 2002. Thus, the difference in the earnings gains between the CMF and CMU partici-
pants and TJB and CS1 participants might be smaller in 2003 than in 2002.
METHOD
Data
The W-2 participant level datasets are drawn from two major sources. The first is
the Client Assistance for Reemployment and Economic Support (CARES) system,
which is maintained by the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development. It 
provides detailed information on the characteristics of W-2 participants and their
placements each month. The second source of data is unemployment insurance
records in Wisconsin, which provides employment and quarterly earning information
of W-2 participants. This study utilizes all W-2 cases enrolled in CARES system from
1997 to 2005. The sample includes participation history, individual characteristics, and
quarterly earnings of 263,333 cases enrolled between October 1997 and June 2005. The
study also uses state policy documents on W-2 contracts, which provides information
on performance standards and changes in them over time.
Analysis Plan
This study analyzes the response of W-2 agencies to the changes in the earnings
gain rate standard and the impact of these changes on W-2 participants’ outcomes
measured by earnings gain. First, the study examines the entry and exit pattern of W-2
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participants during contracting periods, investigating whether the rates of flow in and
flow out of CMF and CMU placements vary across contracting periods. It also examines
whether the number of days participants stay in CMF or CMU placements varies by
contracting years. Second, the study investigates whether the characteristics of partici-
pants in CMF and CMU placements differ during contracting periods. By investigating
W-2 participants’ education level and earning history prior to entering the W-2 program,
we can assess whether W-2 agencies selected the participants with high earning capacity
to meet the earnings gain rate standard.
Third, this study examines the levels of and changes in the earnings gain of different
groups of participants across the four rounds of W-2 contracts to identify the effect of
the earnings gain rate standard, designating CMF and CMU participants as a treatment
group and TJB and CS1 participants as a comparison group. By comparing the changes
in the earnings gain of participants with different job placements, we can confirm the
effect of adopting and eliminating the earnings gain rate standard on the earnings gain
of W-2 participants. This study conducts four sets of regression analysis in which the
quarterly earnings gain of the participants is used as a dependent variable. Table 5 
presents the variables used in the regression analysis. Earnings gain is measured by the
change in quarterly earnings between entry and exit quarters, which is CPI adjusted 
in 2004 constant dollars. A dummy variable, CMFCMU, indicates whether the W-2
participants are in CMF and CMU placements or TJB and CS1 placements (omitted
category). The YEAR variable is used to identify the contract years in which W-2 
participants exited from their current job placements. In the four sets of regression
analysis, different years were used as omitted categories (e.g., 1998-1999 for 2000-
2001). An interaction term, CMFCMU*YEAR, was added to examine whether there
are significant differences between the earnings gain of different W-2 placement
groups over the contracting years.
The regression analysis controls for the participants’ characteristics (age, education
level, race, number of children in their households, age of the youngest child). Several
work and welfare related characteristics of the W-2 participants (number of months on
AFDC, initial W-2 placement, amount of quarterly earnings, and number of quarters
the person was employed prior to entering the W-2 program) are used as covariates.
The regression models also include the characteristics of W-2 agencies, such as loca-
tion (e.g., Milwaukee, other urban or rural areas) and regional unemployment rates.
Standard errors are clustered by W-2 agencies to account for plausible correlations
among participants served by the same agencies (Duggan, 2003). Appendix table 1
shows the characteristics of the W-2 participants from 1997 to 2005.
46 Youseok Choi
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Table 5. Definitions of Variables Used in OLS Regression Analysis
Variables Definitions
Dependent Variable
earnings gain difference in quarterly earnings between the beginning and end of the quarter (2004 constant $)
Independent Variables
beginning earnings earnings at the beginning of the quarter (2004 constant $)
CMFCMU 1= participants in CMF/CMU groups, 0= participants in TJB/CS1 groups
year (2000-2001) 1= exited W-2 in 2000-2001, 0= exited W-2 in 1997-1999
year (2002) 1= exited W-2 in 2002, 0= exited W-2 in 2000-2001
year (2003) 1= exited W-2 in 2003, 0= exited W-2 in 2002
year (2004) 1= exited W-2 in 2004, 0= exited W-2 in 2003
CMFCMU*year (2000-2001) 1= CMF/CMU participants exited in 2000-2001, 0= others
CMFCMU*year (2002) 1= CMF/CMU participants exited in 2002, 0= others
CMFCMU*year (2003) 1= CMF/CMU participants exited in 2003, 0= others
CMFCMU*year (2004) 1= CMF/CMU participants exited in 2004, 0= others
Control Variables
age age of respondents: 10-15, 16-17, 18-25, 26-30, 31-40, 41 or over (ref.)
education education level of respondents: high school or more, high school, less than high school (ref.)
race white (ref.) black, Hispanic, Asian, other
number of children 0 (ref.), 1, 2, 3 or more
age of youngest child no children (ref.), unborn, 0-2, 3-5, 6-12, 13-17
AFDC history number of months receiving AFDC prior to enter W-2: none (ref.), 1-18 months, 19-24 months
initial W-2 assignment W-2 job placements at entry: CMC, upper tier, lower tier (ref.)
pre-entry earning average earnings prior to entering W-2: none (ref.), $1-5,000, $5,001-15,000, $15,001-25,000, $25,001 or more
pre-entry employment number of employed quarters prior to enter W-2: none, 1-4 quarters, 5-7 quarters, 8 quarters (ref.)
service region Milwaukee County, Other Urban Counties, Rural Counties (ref.)
unemployment rate unemployment rate of resident counties 
RESULTS
The Effect of the Earnings Gain Standard on the Response of W-2 Agencies
To explore how W-2 agencies responded to the changes in performance standards,
the dynamic patterns and the movements of participants in and out of the CMF, CMU,
and other job placements (e.g., TJB, CSJ) are examined. First, this study investigates
whether W-2 agencies reduced the number of entrants into CMF and CMU job place-
ments in the 2002-2003 period and deferred the exit of the participants to meet the
earnings gain rate standard.
Table 6 shows the proportion of participants who had entered new job placements
from 1997 to 2005. Multiple sets of t-tests comparing proportions were conducted to
examine whether the proportion of a specific group of participants in a year was different
from that of the previous or subsequent year for the period 1999 to 2004. For example,
CMF participants constituted 21% of the new job placements in 2000, which is 
compared with 22.5% in 1999. Test result shows that the differences are statistically
significant.
The results reveal that the proportion of new CMF participants decreased from
1999 to 2003. During the same period, the proportion of new CMU participants
decreased as well. In contrast, the number of new participants in the lower tier
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Table 6. Proportion of New W-2 Participants by Job Placements, 1997-2005
1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Upper
CMF 4.7 20.5 22.5** 21.0** 16.5** 14.3** 12.6 15.6 11.3
Tier
CMU 25.5 12.0 4.1 3.9** 2.6** 2.3** 1.6 2.0 2.9
CMS 13.9 5.7 9.3** 11.3 11.2** 10.5* 11.0 7.1 12.4
TJB 1.7 0.8 0.6** 0.4** 0.2** 0.3** 0.2 0.3 0.3
Lower
CSJ 29.6 37.6 33.5** 29.9** 33.8** 37.3 37.2 36.1 29.2
Tier
W-2T 13.7 12.8 16.0** 17.8** 18.8 19.0** 20.4 20.6 17.6
CMC 10.3 10.3 13.6** 15.0* 15.7 15.4 15.9 17.3 25.1
Others 0.6 0.3 0.4** 0.7** 1.1 1.0** 1.2 1.0 1.3
N 6,723 33,446 32,120 32,640 35,098 37,058 39,625 37,257 9,366
Note: statistical tests of differences in proportions of participants are conducted for the period 1999-2003.
Proportions in adjacent two years for each job placements are compared.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
increased as the economic situation worsened after 1999. Due to the economic down-
turn, W-2 agencies had to absorb more W-2 applicants, and more participants joined
paid placements such as CSJ, W-2T, and CMC.
The decrease in the proportion of new CMF participants in 2002-2003 might be
related to the increase in the proportion of new CSJ participants to whom the earnings
gain standard was not applied from 2002 onward. W-2 agencies might have reduced
the flow of participants into CMF or CMU placements to which the earnings gain
standard was applied and prevented the CMF or CMU participants who might not
have an earnings gain from exiting.
Table 7 shows the average number of days W-2 participants stayed in each job
placement by the year of entry. The results present t-tests that compare two consecu-
tive average number of days participants remained in job placements from 1999 to
2003. For example, CMF participants who entered in 2000 stayed 141 days, whereas
those who entered in 1999 stayed 127 days. The t-test results show that the difference
in the number of days participants remained in job placements is statistically signifi-
cant. The CMF participants who entered in 2002 stayed for 160 days, which was the
longest period throughout the contract periods, surpassing 127 days of those entering
in 2001.4
The CMU participants who entered in 2002 also remained in their job placements for
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Table 7. Average Number of Days W-2 Participants Remained in Job Placements, 1997-2005
1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total
CMF 147.9 103.1 126.5** 141.4** 126.7** 159.9** 132.9 133.0 62.8 129.3
CMU 161.3 103.1 70.8 71.1 74.6** 87.6** 75.5 65.0 36.2 106.2
TJB 81.7 80.3 73.8 75.0* 62.9 59.0** 66.1 81.0 57.5 74.6
CSJ 216.0 145.0 105.4 103.4** 118.3** 122.3** 129.5 106.4 59.4 124.5
Note: statistical tests of differences in the means of duration days are conducted for the period 1999-2003.
Average duration days in adjacent two years for each job placements are compared.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
4. W-2 agencies might have had incentive to exit participants with good earning prospects in
2002. For example, if CMF participants who entered in that year were more employable,
W-2 agencies might have exited them to meet the earnings gain rate standard, which would
have shortened the amount of time CMF and CMU participants remained in their job
placements. Overall results show that W-2 agencies choose to postpone ending the services
they provided to CMF and CMU participants in 2002 rather terminate them early.
a longer period than their counterparts did in 2001. TJB participants show no significant
difference in the length of time they remained in their job placements between the two
years. However, CSJ participants remained in their jobs an average of 4 days longer,
which is much lower than the 33 days for CMF participants between 2001 and 2002.
W-2 agencies might have been postponing the exit of participants with poor perfor-
mance from CMF or CMU placements.
The variations in the average number of days W-2 participants remained in different
job placements are related to the exit rate of W-2 participants. Table 8 shows the 
proportion of W-2 participants who exited by job placements during the four rounds of
the W-2 contracts. The proportion of participants who exited the CMF placement
declined about 38% from 20.4% in 2001 to 12.5% in 2002. The proportion of CMF
participants who exited slightly increased in 2003 when the earnings gain rate standard
was not applied. A major reason for the decline in the proportion of participants exiting
CMF and CMU placements in 2002 was the decrease in the number of new entrants 
in these placements that began in 2000. In contrast, the share of participants in the
lower tier who exited (e.g., CSJ, W-2T, CMC) increased over time. The proportion of
participants in the CSJ placement increased from 30.7% in 2001 to 38.0% in 2002, an
increase of 26%.
W-2 agencies might have selected the participants with higher earning capacity for
CMF or CMU placements in the third contract period, particularly in 2002. To ascertain
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Table 8. Proportion of W-2 Participants Who Exited the W-2 Program, 1997-2005
1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Upper
CMF 3.9 17.5 20.8** 19.8 20.4** 12.5** 14.7 13.2 17.9
Tier
CMU 25.9 16.9 4.3 4.1** 2.8* 2.5** 1.8 1.8 2.1
CMS 19.9 7.6 8.6** 11.2 11.3 11.0** 11.9 6.6 7.6
TJB 3.0 1.0 0.6 0.5** 0.2** 0.3** 0.2 0.2 0.2
Lower
CSJ 22.7 34.3 37.1** 30.9 30.7** 38.0** 35.1 39.1 31.7
Tier
W-2T 11.0 11.2 15.0** 17.8 17.9** 18.8 19.2 21.4 22.4
CMC 12.2 11.1 13.2** 14.9** 15.7 15.9 15.9 16.6 17.4
Other 1.5 0.4 0.4** 0.7** 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.7
N 2,041 28,675 32,594 32,218 34,508 35,169 39,228 39,279 19,621
Note: statistical tests of differences in proportions of participants were conducted for the period 1999-2003.
Proportions in adjacent years for each job placement are compared.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
whether they did, this study explores whether there were differences in the characteris-
tics of new CMF and CMU participants when they entered the W-2 program. Table 9
shows education level, annual earnings, and number of quarters the participant had
been employed at baseline for new CMF and CMU participants across the four rounds
of W-2 contracts.
The percentage of CMF and CMU participants with higher education had increased
since 1999. However, no distinctive differences were found between the second and
the third contract periods, particularly between 2001 and 2002. In contrast, the levels of
annual earnings of CMF and CMU participants at baseline show substantial differences
between the two contracting periods. The earning capacity of W-2 participants assigned
to CMF or CMU placements since 2002 has been higher than that of those from the
pre-2002 period. While the percentage of participants with no earnings declined from
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Table 9. Features of New CMF/CMU Participants by Entry Year
1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Education
less than high school 39.0 48.9 51.7 51.2** 48.9 47.3* 45.4 46.3 48.8
high school 44.9 39.1 37.5 38.1** 40.5 41.8 43.2 41.9 40.4
more than high school 12.8 10.2 9.9 10.2 10.1 10.5 11.0 11.0 8.7
Annual Earnings
no Earnings 13.3 12.7 14.3** 40.4** 56.8** 41.3** 33.3 30.9 31.9
$1-5,000 71.0 68.5 63.1** 47.0** 35.5** 39.8** 42.7 43.1 44.6
$5,001-15000 14.9 17.4 20.4** 11.4** 7.1** 15.2** 19.5 20.2 18.3
$15,001025,000 0.8 1.2 2.0** 1.1** 0.5** 3.2* 4.0 4.7 4.7
over $25,001 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1** 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.5
Number of Quarters Employed
none 13.3 12.7 14.3** 40.4** 56.8** 41.3** 33.3 30.9 31.9
1-4 quarters 42.6 37.6 35.3** 26.5** 20.3 21.2** 23.2 23.7 24.3
5-7 quarters 30.0 33.0 30.1** 21.7** 15.0** 21.6** 24.7 27.1 27.0
8 quarters 14.1 16.7 20.2** 11.3** 8.0** 15.9** 18.8 18.2 16.9
N 2,027 10,873 8,532 8,119 6,732 6,148 5,646 6,558 1,328
Note: statistical tests of differences in proportions of participants are conducted for the period 1999-2003.
Proportions in adjacent two years for each job placements are compared.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
57% in 2001 to 41% in 2002, the participants with earnings ranging from $5,000 to
$25,000 increased in 2002.
The employment history prior to entering the W-2 program also shows similar 
patterns as found in the prior earnings of CMF and CMU participants. The employment
history of W-2 participants assigned to CMF or CMU placements since 2002 is longer
than that of those from earlier periods. The percentage of those with an earning history
longer than 8 quarters increased from 8% in 2001 to 16% in 2002. Overall, the results
suggest that W-2 agencies responded to the changes in the earnings gain rate standard
by controlling the movement of W-2 participants and assigning those who were more
likely to show an earnings gain to CMF or CMU placements.
The Effect of Earnings Gain Standard on the Earning Outcomes 
of W-2 Participants
Figure 1 shows the earnings at the exited quarter for exited W-2 participants in 
different job placements from 1997 to 2004. Except for TJB placement, the levels of
exited quarter earnings are higher for the participants in unsubsidized employment
placements (CMF, CMU) than those in subsidized placements (CS1). Compared with
the participants in CMF or CMU placements, the participants in the TJB placement
show greater variability in exited quarter earnings. The exited quarter earnings of TJB
participants declined during 2000-2002, then started increasing in 2002.
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Figure 1. Exited Quarter Earnings of W-2 Participants by Job Placements
Table 10 shows the key results of the four sets of OLS regression models of earnings
gain. An interaction term was included in each model with varying years to examine
whether the earnings gain of CMF and CMU participants was different from that of
TJB and CS1 participants. The first panel compares the changes in the earnings gain
of the two groups between the first and the second contract periods. The interaction
term, as a difference-in-difference estimator (CMFCMU*year 2000-2001), shows that
the difference in the earnings gain of CMF and CMU participants from the first period
to the second contract period is greater than the earnings gain difference of CS1 and
TJB participants for the same period by $83. However, the differential is statistically
insignificant.
The second panel compares the changes in the earnings gain of the two groups
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Table 10. OLS Regression Predicting Quarterly Earnings Gain of W-2 Participants
Coefficient Robust S.E.
beginning earnings -0.3 0.01**
1998-99 vs. 2000-2001 CMFCMU (CS1, TJB as base) -479.09 73.33**
(n=33,930) year 2000-2001 (1998-99 as base) -97.24 123.49
CMFCMU*year 2000-2001 83.22 123.92
beginning earnings -0.31 0.01**
2000-2001 vs. 2002 CMFCMU (CS1, TJB as base) 178.96 45.95**
(n=23,195) year 2002 (2000-2001 as base) -160.48 72.28*
CMFCMU*year 2002 152.37 73.45*
beginning earnings -0.32 0.01**
2002 vs. 2003 CMFCMU (CS1, TJB as base) 320.07 58.57**
(n=13,629) year 2003 (2002 as base) 113.64 74.63
CMFCMU*year 2003 -40.59 80.38
beginning earnings -0.33 0.01**
2003 vs. 2004 CMFCMU (CS1TJB) 285.66 56.69**
(n=14,457) year 2004 (2003) -42.51 73.07
CMFCMU*year 2004 15.67 77.21
Note: Control variables included in the analysis are respondents’ age, education level, race, number of chil-
dren in their households, age of the youngest child, length of periods on AFDC, initial W-2 placements,
amount of quarterly earnings, number of employed quarters prior to entering the W-2 program, service
region, and regional unemployment rates. Detailed results are available on request from the author.
Omitted categories are in parentheses.
*p <0.05 **p<0.01,
between 2000-2001 and 2002. The difference in the earnings gain of CMF and CMU
participants from 2000-2001 to 2002 is greater than for the TJB and CS1 participants
by $152. Figure 2 illustrates these findings in detail. The application of the earnings
gain standard to CMF and CMU placements prevented a decrease in earnings gain for
them in 2002. However, TJB and CS1 participants, to whom the earnings gain standard
was no longer applied, had a $160 decrease in earnings gain in 2002. Thus, the earnings
gain standard had a positive effect on the earnings gain of CMF and CMU participants.
The third and fourth panels in table 10 show the changes in earnings gain from
2002 to 2003 and 2003 to 2004, respectively. Since 2003, the earnings gain standard
has not been required and has become an optional one for collecting performance
information. The difference in the earnings gain of CMF and CMU participants from
2002 to 2003 is $41 lower than the change in earnings gain of TJB and CS1 participants.
From 2003 to 2004, the change in earnings gain of CMF and CMU participants is only
$16 higher than that of TJB and CS1 participants. Both differences in earnings gain
are statistically insignificant. These results confirm that the earnings gain rate standard
had a positive impact on maintaining the earnings gain of W-2 participants.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study has analyzed how W-2 agencies responded to the adoption of the earnings
gain rate standard and whether the standard influenced the economic outcomes of W-2
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Figure 2. Changes in Earnings Gain for CMF/CMU and TJB/CS1 participants
participants. Our findings suggest that applying the earnings gain standard to CMF
and CMU participants in 2002 had a positive effect on maintaining the earnings gain
of the group even though financial incentives had been weak and the unemployment
rate had been relatively high since 2000. The effect of the transformation in 2003 of
the earnings gain standard from a required standard in 2002 into an information-only
standard reconfirms the positive role of the earnings gain standard.
However, our findings also demonstrate that W-2 agencies may have selected 
participants who were more likely to have a higher earning capacity and may have
altered the movement of participants in and out of CMF and CMU job placements.
Under exacerbating economic conditions after 2000, it might have been challenging
for W-2 agencies to meet the earnings gain rate standard. Various factors such as local
labor market conditions and the characteristics of jobs for W-2 participants might have
affected the earnings of W-2 participants. Such conditions might have induced W-2
agencies to meet the earnings gain standard by changing the movement of W-2 partici-
pants in and out of the program. These results confirm theoretical predictions on the
roles of performance incentives and gaming behaviors of contractors (Courty &
Marshke, 1997, 2004; Koning & Heinrich, 2013). This study contributes to the literature
on performance-based contracting by examining both intended effects of introducing
performance standards and unintended effects of selection and parking problems in a
balanced way.
The positive effects of the earnings gain rate standard also imply that retaining
other employment-related performance standards (e.g., entered employment, job
retention) might have beneficial effects on W-2 participants’ economic outcomes or at
least prevent a decline in their economic performances. Since 2000, W-2 agencies
have had to apply these employment-related standards to all W-2 participants to obtain
RFS and performance bonuses. To assess their effect on W-2 participants’ economic
outcomes, it would also be necessary to investigate the gaming responses of W-2
agencies to them.
Our findings have several implications for the design of service contracts in welfare
programs. First, state governments might achieve policy goals by motivating service
providers to use well-deigned performance standards, tying their use of such standards
to administrative and financial rewards. Second, states can share the financial risk
assumed by providers by offering more incentives and adjusting performance standards.
Because of decreasing financial incentives for W-2 agencies, imposing strict perfor-
mance standards to obtain rewards did not prevent W-2 agencies’ gaming behaviors,
such as selecting W-2 participants and controlling the movement of W-2 participants.
Such responses are W-2 agencies’ attempts to avoid financial and administrative risks
when they do not meet required performance standards.
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The elimination of the earnings gain rate standard in 2003 was an attempt to eliminate
the incentive to game on the part of W-2 agencies. Recognizing that the unintended
effects of outcome-oriented performance standards might lead to gaming behaviors, 
in 2002 Wisconsin introduced process-oriented performance standards such as basic
educational activities (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2005). Such changes in
the sets of performance standards might reduce the gaming behaviors of W-2 agencies.
Constraining the freedom of W-2 agencies, however, might also undermine the innov-
ative efforts of W-2 agencies. Wisconsin also encouraged W-2 agencies to achieve their
policy goals by inviting them to closely communicate with the state, share performance-
related information, and participate in setting performance standards and target levels.
These are more effective than forcing W-2 agencies to achieve performance standards
solely drafted by the state.
The arrangements of performance-based contracting might have a substantial
impact on the well-being of welfare program participants. For example, an evaluation
of the W-2 program reveals that there are differences in the types of service provision
and average annual income of former W-2 participants across W-2 agencies (Wisconsin
Legislative Audit Bureau, 2005). Although the evaluation does not adjust for varying
characteristics of the participants and local economic conditions, the substantial varia-
tions across W-2 agencies indicate that the agencies might influence the well-being of
welfare participants as well as the manner in which the participants receive services.
The variation also raises a recurring question regarding whether different types of welfare
agencies deliver appropriate services to participants in an equitable way (Wisconsin
Legislative Audit Bureau, 2005). The state could use performance-based contracting
as a tool to regulate welfare agencies’ behaviors.
This study has several limitations with regard to exactly identifying the effects of
performance standards on the economic outcomes of W-2 participants and the behaviors
of W-2 agencies. First, this study mainly used the earnings gain measure to evaluate
the economic performance of a subset of W-2 participants. However, other measures
such as earnings gain after one to three years would also be useful to evaluate the
midterm value-added of W-2 participants. Future research needs to develop multiple
performance measures to evaluate the performance of welfare program participants
comprehensively. It is also necessary to examine how various performance standards
are associated with each other. Because varying factors are associated with the
achievement of different performance goals, W-2 agencies might use varying strategies
and mobilize different resources to achieve diverse performance goals (Marschke,
2002).
Second, this study tried to identify selection and parking effects by examining entry
and exit patterns, number of days in job placements, and variations in participants’
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characteristics over contract periods and across focal groups of W-2 participants. A
more rigorous test of the effects requires additional regression analysis. For example, a
binary probit analysis, which predicts probability of entry into and exit from CMF and
CMU placements, is needed. In addition, regression analysis using the number of days
a participant remains in a job placement as dependent variable is required to identify
the parking effect thoroughly.
Further research needs to investigate whether performance contracting would stan-
dardize service provision and ensure equitable services. Performance contracting is an
outcome control mechanism, providing substantial leeway for service contractors to
design the services creatively. Advances in performance management systems might
compromise that leeway. Performance management prioritizes effectiveness or improve-
ment in performance over the provision of equitable services to program participants.
However, welfare advocates and stakeholders have been concerned about the equity of
service provision (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2005). Future research needs
to address the concerns about equity by examining whether the emergence of private
providers and their responses to performance-based contracting affect the equity of
service provision.
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Appendix Table 1. Characteristics of W-2 Participants, 1997-2005
1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract









CMU CSJ CMU CSJ CMU CSJ CMU CSJ
Number of Participants at Baseline by Age
16-17 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
18-25 46.9 49.3 49.5 54.9 57.4 57.1 59.3 61.7 61.6 62.2 65.5 64.1
26-30 21.8 19.3 19.7 18.0 15.8 16.4 16.2 14.5 14.9 14.7 12.7 13.5
31-40 25.3 24.9 24.3 21.4 20.7 20.5 19.0 18.0 17.8 17.3 16.2 16.7
41 or more 5.8 6.0 6.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.3
missing 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Education
less than high school 48.5 61.3 53.8 50.9 64.5 56 47.2 59.3 53.8 46.0 57.6 52.7
high school 39.4 30.1 35.5 38.5 28.7 34.9 41.9 32.7 36.9 42.2 33.4 37
more than high school 10.4 7.4 9.2 10.0 6.4 8.6 10.6 7.7 9 10.9 7.7 9.1
missing 1.7 1.3 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.3 1.1
Race
white 26.0 14.7 24.7 24.8 16.4 25.4 27.5 17.7 26.4 21.5 14.6 24.1
black 61.9 73.7 63.7 63.6 70.8 63 60.2 70.1 61.9 67.3 72.2 64.1
Hispanic 7.1 7.5 7 8.1 9.9 8.2 9.4 9.5 8.8 8.2 9.4 8.4
other 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.2
Asian 2.6 1.7 2.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.5 2
missing 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Number of Children
none 1.7 1.4 2.4 3.2 3.2 4.3 5.2 4.5 6.1 5.9 6.5 7.5
1 31.0 33.4 34.3 39.4 43.1 42.1 45.7 49.2 47.7 50.3 53.0 50.8
2 28.0 26.8 26.9 26.3 25.3 25.6 25.0 23.1 23.4 22.6 21.0 21.7
3 or more 39.3 38.4 36.3 31.1 28.4 28 24.1 23.2 22.8 21.3 19.5 20
Age of Youngest Child
unborn child at entry 11.8 14.3 16.5 14.9 15.0 17.5 16.4 15.5 18.3 16.7 16.7 18.5
0-2 years 46.0 43.9 44.7 49.8 49.6 49.9 52.2 51.6 51.8 52.6 53.6 53.6
3-5 years 18.6 17.6 16.1 14.5 14.1 13.2 12.7 13.1 11.7 12.8 12.5 11.5
6-12 years 18.8 18.7 17.4 16.1 16.3 14.9 14.6 15.5 14.1 13.8 13.4 12.8
13-17 years 4.8 5.4 5.1 4.3 4.6 4.3 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.4
no children 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
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1st Contract 2nd Contract 3rd Contract 4th Contract









CMU CSJ CMU CSJ CMU CSJ CMU CSJ
Number of Months AFDC Received before Entry
0 months 22.1 21.8 26.8 55.9 56.3 58.8 72.6 73.6 73.5 78.5 80.3 79.4
1-18 months 34.1 32.8 32.8 19.6 17.5 17.5 13.4 11.8 12.1 10.0 8.2 8.8
19-24 months 43.8 45.4 40.4 24.5 26.1 23.8 14.0 14.6 14.4 11.5 11.5 11.8
Initial W-2 Assignment
lower tier 54.5 76.5 62.4 54.8 69.0 58.4 51.9 64.3 55.7 53.2 62.5 54.6
CMC tier 9.9 8.0 13.1 17.1 14.6 19.5 21.8 18.0 23.7 22.4 19.6 25.7
upper tier 35.4 15.4 24.4 28.1 16.4 22.1 26.3 17.7 20.7 24.4 18.0 19.8
missing 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0
Pre-Entry Earnings
none 13.0 20.5 17.3 40.8 46.5 48.2 41.9 45.1 40.3 31.3 38.2 34.5
$1-5000 67.5 67.1 65.8 46.2 45.8 42.8 39.5 42.2 43.5 43.4 45.8 45.8
$5001-15000 17.9 11.4 15.4 11.9 7.0 8.2 15.2 10.6 13.3 19.9 12.9 15.8
$15001-25000 1.5 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.8 3.0 1.8 2.4 4.6 2.6 3.3
$25,001 or more 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.6
missing 0.1 0.0 0 0.1 0.0 0 0.0 0.1 0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Number of Quarters Employed before Entry
none 13.0 20.5 17.3 40.8 46.5 48.2 41.9 45.1 40.3 31.3 38.2 34.5
1-4 quarters 37.6 42.8 38.9 26.2 29.6 26.3 21.5 25.8 25.7 23.7 29.0 27.9
5-7 quarters 31.9 26.3 29 21.1 16.7 17.2 21.1 19.1 20.9 26.8 22.1 24
8 quarters 17.4 10.4 14.8 11.9 7.2 8.3 15.5 9.9 13 18.2 10.6 13.6
missing 0.1 0.0 0 0.1 0.0 0 0.0 0.1 0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Region
Milwaukee County 71.3 86.0 72.1 75.1 85.4 73.5 74.7 85.5 73.3 80.6 88.2 75.4
other urban counties 19.5 10.0 18.9 16.9 11.6 18.7 16.2 11.2 18.9 12.0 8.2 17
rural counties 9.2 4.0 9.1 7.7 2.8 7.5 8.8 2.8 7.3 6.8 3.0 7
missing 0.0 0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6
Unemployment Rate 3.7 4.8 6.6 5.9
Number of Participants 18,636 22,294 63,310 15,743 20,777 66,726 11,737 27,322 74,397 9,847 21,701 58,900 
